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POTENTIAL, VALUE AND PROBABILITY 
 







This paper focuses on the probabilistic point of view and proposes a extremely 
simple probabilistic model that provides a single and simple story to account for several 
extensions of the Shapley value, as weighted Shapley values, semivalues, and weak 
(weighted or not) semivalues, and the Shapley value itself. Moreover, some of the most 
interesting conditions or notions that have been introduced in the search of alternatives 
to Shapley's seminal characterization, as 'balanced contributions' and the 'potential', are 
reinterpreted from this same point of view. In this new light these notions and some 
results lose their 'mystery' and acquire a clear and simple meaning. These illuminating 
reinterpretations strongly vindicate the complementariness of the probabilistic and the 
axiomatic approaches, and shed serious doubts about the achievements of the axiomatic 
approach since Nash's and Shapley's seminal papers in connection with the genuine 
notion of value. 
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From Shapley’s (1953a) seminal paper a copious family of ’solutions’ (of what?) for trans-
ferable utility (TU) games has grown in diﬀerent directions with many ramiﬁcations.
Among others, weighted Shapley values (Shapley (1953b), Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988),
Weber (1988)), probabilistic values (Weber, 1979, 1988), semivalues (Weber (1979, 1988),
Dubey, Neyman and Weber (1981), Einy (1987)), weak semivalues and weighted weak
semivalues (Calvo and Santos, 2000), as well as nontransferable utility (NTU) and non
atomic extensions of some of these notions, or their restriction to special subdomains as,
e.g., simple games. In fact, a lot of energy has been and is still devoted in cooperative
game theory to the study of these ramiﬁcations, and to the search of new axiomatic char-
acterizations of these objects, be it the very seminal concept (e.g., Dubey (1975), Myerson
(1980), Young (1985), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), Feltkamp (1995)) or any of its ex-
tensions, in diﬀerent domains. Most of these extensions have been born out of axiomatic
explorations: dropping axioms and seeing what happens, ﬁnding weaker or more appealing
ones, recombining already existing ones, etc. Less attention has been paid to the meaning
of the resulting families. As a result, the ’stories’ behind some of these mathematical
constructions do not seem very much compelling or even transparent.
As is well-known, the Shapley value and some of these extensions admit a more or less
clear interpretation in probabilistic terms. From this point of view, Weber’s (1979, 1988)
concept of probabilistic value, or, better, of group value, is the concept that covers the
notions formerly alluded with which we deal in this paper. A group value is a vector of
probabilistic values, that is, a vector of expected marginal contributions to the worth of a
coalition based on n diﬀerent points of view. In other words, each player has his/her own
assessment of the probability of joining diﬀerent coalitions. Nevertheless the possibility of
accommodating diﬀerent extensions into this very general notion is achieved at the cost
of a quite diﬀerent probabilistic story for every case: the formation of the grand coalition
in a certain order, all orders being equally probable (the Shapley value) or not (weighted
Shapley values); or the probabilistic assessments of the diﬀerent players of the coalition
they will join satisfying diﬀerent ’consistency’ requirements (semivalues, weak semivalues
and weighted weak semivalues). The same can be said about diﬀerent notions, as for
instance the potential (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989), for which it is possible to give an ad
hoc probabilistic interpretation. Perhaps the lack of a tightly ﬁtting and really unifying
probabilistic model has contributed to overlooking the possibilities of the probabilistic
approach, or maybe it has been the other way round, the lack of attention to this approach
explains the lack of a clear unifying model so far.
Be it as it may, in this paper we focus on the probabilistic point of view and propose a
3surprisingly simple probabilistic model that provides a single and simple story to account
for these ’solutions’. Extremely simple variations (particular cases, in fact) of this basic
story account for the above mentioned families supported in the literature by diﬀerent ax-
iomatic combinations. Moreover, some of the most interesting conditions and notions that
have been introduced in the search of alternatives to Shapley’s seminal characterization, as
’balanced contributions’ (Myerson, 1980) and the ’potential’ (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989),
are reinterpreted from this same point of view. In this new light these notions lose their
’mystery’ and acquire a clear and simple meaning. One of the most remarkable results
of this reinterpretation, apart from its simplicity, is the fact that in this new light the
’weights’ present in weighted Shapley values, weighted weak semivalues, weighted balanced
contributions or weighted potential, evaporate as an ’optical eﬀect’. So, weighted weak
semivalues appear in a precise sense as the Shapley value’s ’natural family’, while the
other are narrower circles around the seminal concept that correspond to particular cases
of the general model. Similarly, against the common appreciation, in this model it turns
out that weighted potential and weighted balanced contributions are natural and general
conditions with a clear meaning, while the corresponding non weighted notions appear as
ad hoc variations of these notions devoid in general of a clear meaning, whose main virtue
seems to be the fact that, along with eﬃciency, allow to single out the Shapley value.
On the other hand, the extremely simple probabilistic story that accounts for all these
notions seems to have very little to do with Shapley’s original interpretation of his ’value’
for TU games, in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) notion of value
of a two-person zero sum game, and Nash’s (1950) solution to the bargaining problem.
Thus, the lack of a clear matching of the diﬀerent combinations of axioms with the genuine
notion of value, along with their perfect matching with the extreme simple model sheds
serious doubts about the achievements of the axiomatic approach in connection with the
notion of value as is discussed in the concluding remarks.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the seminal concept of the Shapley
value is brieﬂy reviewed. In section 3 the unifying probabilistic model is formulated. In
section 4 it is shown how the Shapley value and some of its extensions, as (weighted
or not) weak semivalues, semivalues, and weighted Shapley values ﬁt into the proposed
probabilistic model. In section 5 the main properties that have been introduced in the
literature in search of alternatives to linearity in Shapley’s original characterization, as
’transfer’ (Dubey, 1975), ’balanced contributions’ (Myerson, 1980), ’strong monotonicity’
(Young, 1985), and the ’potential’ (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) are reinterpreted and
discussed in terms of the probabilistic model introduced in section 3. Finally, section 6
summarizes the main conclusions along with some methodological remarks, and some lines
4of further research.
2 The Shapley value
An N-coalitional game is a pair (N,v), where N = {1,...,n} is a set of players and v is a
map that assigns to each subset or coalition S ⊆ N ar e a ln u m b e ro rworth v(S), such that
v(∅) = 0. The model was introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In the
usual interpretation the worth of a coalition represents what this coalition can guarantee
for itself if it forms. This ’worth’ can be the amount of something objectively measurable as
money, or some other physical entity (water, oil, land, mineral, etc.). A second possibility
is interpreting it as ’utility’, assuming that there exists some inﬁnitely divisible good in
which the players’ utility is linear. In the ﬁrst interpretation nothing about the players
or their preferences is put into the model beyond the implicit assumption that for all of
them ’the more the better’. In the second, these preferences are included at the cost of a
very simplifying assumption according to which all players are virtually identical. Because
of this second interpretation coalitional games are often called transferable utility (TU)
games. GN will denote the set of all coalitional games with N as the set of players. When
this set is clear from the context we will refer by v to game (N,v). We will drop i’s
brackets in S\{i} and S ∪ {i}.
On this basis Shapley (1953a) proposed the seminal concept that, as commented in
the introduction, is the starting point for a number of extensions. For a game (N,v)t h e




(n − s)!(s − 1)!
n!
(v(S) − v(S\i)). (1)
There are several interpretations of the map Shi : GN → RN, characterized by the
well-known conditions of eﬃciency, anonymity, null player and additivity1. Shapley’s
original interpretation is that of a ’value’ for TU games in the sense of von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s (1944) notion of value of a two-person zero sum games, and that of Nash’s
(1950) solution to the bargaining problem. That is to say, the value that would mean
for a rational player the prospect of engaging into any situation of the class considered
with other rational players, TU games in this case. An alternative interpretation is as
an allocation rule, or a way of distributing the worth of the grand coalition among the n
players in any situation describable as a coalitional game. It is the only allocating rule
1In fact Shapley’s original characterization is slightly diﬀerent as the original framework involves a
’universe’ of players. In the literature there are a variety of alternative characterizations to some of which
we will refer later.
5that satisﬁes the above mentioned conditions, that can be interpreted (at least three of
them) in normative terms. A third interpretation is as an expected payoﬀ of each player
for a speciﬁc random procedure to form the grand coalition sequentially and assigning
to each player his/her marginal contribution to the worth of the coalition formed when
incorporating2. A forth interpretation is as a utility function ϕ(i,v)=Shi(v)r e p r e s e n t i n g
von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over ’roles’ or positions (i,v) in coalitional games
and lotteries over them3.
The second interpretation is the one that seems to prevail nowadays and the one
that has attracted more attention. And it is the axiomatic approach that has absorbed
most of the attention in search of alternative characterizations of the Shapley value and
its extension in diﬀerent directions and domains. In this paper we concentrate in the
domain of n-person coalitional games and in the probabilistic interpretation of some of
the extensions of the seminal concept in this domain, as well as on the interpretation of
some of the conditions which have been introduced in the literature as alternatives to
additivity with characterizing purposes.
3 A unifying probabilistic model
In the standard interpretation of a coalitional game (N,v), this pair is all what is put into
the model. Here, consistently with the interpretation of a coalitional game according to
which no information about the players is included, we see a coalitional game as only one
of the ingredients in a more general model. Here v(S) is seen as what coalition S would get
if it forms. So far so good, this in accordance with the usual orthodox story. The diﬀer-
ence is this: we assume that only a coalition will form. This still seems in accordance with
orthodoxy, in which (at least for the Shapley value and some of its ’eﬃcient’ variations)
the grand coalition will ﬁnally form, though players do not receive their marginal contri-
bution to its worth. But here we include a second independent ingredient: a probability
distribution over all coalitions. In other terms, the coalition that will form is a random
coalition. This in fact amounts to admit the insuﬃciency of the information contained in
the sole coalitional game. In a ﬁrst step it is as if the probability distribution that speciﬁes
the random coalition were exogenous.A tﬁrst sight this may give rise to a certain reluc-
tance, as usually closed models in which everything is endogenous are preferred however
2This is also in Shapley (1953), where is presented as a bargaining model in which a single random
move settles the issue.
3This interpretation is the motivating idea in Shapley (1953), although his treatment does not involve
preferences explicitly. For a more explicit study from this point of view see Roth (1977a), and also Roth
(1977b) and Laruelle and Valenciano (2000) in the context of simple games.
6unconvincing stories might support them. A second motive of uneasiness may arise from
the assumption that only one coalition will form: why if S forms, the rest of the players
in N\S cannot form other coalitions in their turn? We will come back to these points.
Thus, a second input enters the model: a distribution of probability p that associates
with each coalition S its probability of forming p(S). In other words and to avoid misun-
derstandings, the elementary events are the coalitions in 2N. As the number of coalitions
is ﬁnite, any such a probability distribution can be represented by a map p :2 N → R,
where 0 ≤ p(S) ≤ 1 for any S ⊆ N, and
 
S⊆N
p(S)=1 . We assume that the probability of
any player belonging to the resulting coalition is strictly positive, that is, for all i ∈ N




This rules out the case of players who will never belong to the resulting coalition. Such
cases can be dealt with by eliminating this player and reformulating appropriately the
coalitional game and the probability distribution for the remaining n−1p l a y e r s .L e tPN
denote the set of all such probability distributions.
A few remarks are worth here. First note that these probability distributions include
the possibility of no coalition forming if p(∅) > 0, but the trivial case p(∅) = 1 is excluded4.
Second, the events ’i belongs to the resulting coalition’ and ’j belongs to the resulting
coalition’ are not necessarily independent in this model, in which the independence is only
a particular case.
It is important to stress also that this distribution of probability is not meant to be
interpreted as a subjective probability of any particular player, as it is the case in the
’probabilistic values’ (Weber, 1979) and usual interpretations of other cooperative game
theoretic concepts that will be reviewed later. These probabilities are to be interpreted
either as an objective probability or as some external probabilistic assessment, possibly
based on the frequencies of coalitions in previous cases, or whatever available data. This
leaves open the door both to descriptive applications and, in the theoretical level, to the
enrichment of the model involving the players’ preferences, or their relative proximity or
aﬃnities dependent on additional information, which may inﬂuence the probabilities of
diﬀerent coalitions.
Thus we have two inputs: a coalitional game (N,v) ∈ GN and a probability distribution
over coalitions p ∈ PN. Given these two data, the expected marginal contribution of any
4Mind here ’∅’ does not denote the empty event, but the event of no coalition forming, or better the
empty coalition being the one formed. In the example of voting later commented this corresponds to the
case in which everybody votes ’no’.
7player i to the coalition that will form is given by
Ep[v(S) − v(S\i)] =
 
S:i∈S
p(S)(v(S) − v(S\i)). (2)
One can also calculate the expected marginal contribution of any player i to the coali-
tion that will form, conditional to such player belonging to it, that will be denoted by
Φi(v,p) and is given for player i by
Φi(v,p): =Ep[v(S) − v(S\i) | S   i]=
Ep[v(S) − v(S\i)]















(v(S) − v(S\i)). (3)
Or, denoting pi the probability distribution over coalitions resulting from p conditional
to ’i ∈ S’ (i.e., the coalition that will form contains i), that is,






p(T) if i ∈ S,
0o t h e r w i s e ,
(3) can be rewritten as
Φi(v,p)=Epi[v(S) − v(S\i)] =
 
S:i∈S
pi(S)(v(S) − v(S\i)). (4)
Which is the interest of the data provided by formulae (2) and (3) or (4)? If a coalition
is forming it is ingenuous for players to expect receiving their marginal contribution. If
players are not stupid they should know this will probably be too much or too little to ask
for. Nevertheless, the marginal contribution of each player to the coalition which forms
seems a reasonable assessment of the importance or relevance of this player, and a possible
basis for claims, relative to other members of such coalition. This is exactly what these
formulae give (conditionally or unconditionally) for a random coalition based on the two
inputs.
Before proceeding with the reexamination of some cooperative game theoretic notions
from the point of view provided by the present model, an example will be of some help.
A context in which this basic model makes a clear sense is provided by simple games
when they are interpreted as models of voting procedures5. A voting procedure for n
voters may be represented by a simple game, a particular class of coalitional games, by
assigning worth 1 to coalitions that can pass a decision and worth 0 to those that cannot.
In strict terms this is only a way of representing the voting rule itself. In other words,
5In fact it was revising the foundations of the theory of voting power as the basic idea of the model
presented in this paper emerged.
8it includes no information about the ’players’ or voters who might use the rule to make
decisions. Diﬀerent voters with diﬀerent preferences and behavior may use the same
voting rule. In Laruelle and Valenciano (2002) a revision of the foundations of the theory
of voting power is undertaken basing it on two separate inputs: the voting rule, that can
be speciﬁed by a simple game (N,v), and a ’voting behavior’, described by a probability
distribution p over the coalitions, or what seems a more appropriate term in that context,
the ’voting conﬁgurations’ or possible results of a vote. That is, p(S)r e p r e s e n t si nt h i s
case the probability of the conﬁguration of votes in which voters in S vote ’yes’ and
voters in N\S vote ’no’. The necessary separation between game-procedure on one hand
and players-voters on the other seems obvious in this case, and formulae (2) and (4)
represent, respectively, the probability of voter i being decisive in passing a decision, and
the conditional probability of voter i being decisive in passing a decision, given that i
supports it.
Back to the general case, note that diﬀerent distributions of probability can lead to
the same conditional expected marginal contribution. The reason is that whatever the
probability of the empty coalition, it does not aﬀect the expected marginal contribution
of player i conditional to the coalition that forms contains i, as far as the probability of
the nonempty coalitions remains proportional. Therefore one can modify the probability
of the empty coalition and re-scale proportionally the probability of the others without
modifying the expected conditional marginal contributions. But this is the only degree of
freedom.
Proposition 1 Let p,p  ∈ PN,t h e nΦi(v,p)=Φi(v,p ) for any player i and any coali-





1 − p (∅)
for all S  = ∅.
Observe that the trivial case p(∅) = 1 is excluded in the model. On the other hand, the
degree of indeterminacy for probability distributions that yield a same assessment would
disappear if it is required p(∅) = 0. But this would rule out, for instance, the case in which
every player independently joins the coalition that will form with a certain probability.
Thus we will not exclude the case p(∅) > 0.
4 Some cooperative ’solutions’ revisited
In this section we study the relationships between the probabilistic model presented in
the previous section and some game theoretic concepts to be found in the literature on
coalitional games, as weighted weak semivalues, weak semivalues, semivalues, and weighted
9Shapley values, and the Shapley value itself. As will be shown, this simple probabilistic
model gives a clear conceptual common basis to reinterpret coherently from a uniﬁed
point of view these game theoretic concepts as particular cases of (3) or its equivalent (4),
for particular probability distributions. We will proceed from the widest to the narrower
classes of ’solutions’, concluding with the Shapley value itself. But previously let us brieﬂy
compare our model with the notion of probabilistic value6.
4.1 Probabilistic values
Probabilistic values were introduced by Weber (1979, 1988). For any i ∈ N, a probabilistic





S(v(S) − v(S\i)), (5)
for some pi
S such that 0 ≤ pi




S =1 . Where the pi
S are interpreted as player
i’s subjective distribution of probability over the coalitions containing this player, based
on his/her own subjective assessment of the probability of joining diﬀerent coalitions7.
Thus a probabilistic value involves and concerns only one player. Weber characterized
these real valued maps by the linearity, dummy and positivity axioms.
¿From formula (4) it is immediate to check that for any distribution of probability
p ∈ PN,a n da n yp l a y e ri, Φi(-,p) is, formally speaking, a ’probabilistic value’. Thus,
formally speaking, for any distribution p, Φ(-,p), is a vector of probabilistic values. Nev-
ertheless the interpretation underlying either concept is diﬀerent. A probabilistic value,
as ﬁrst introduced by Weber, was interpreted as a subjective evaluation of a player’s
marginal contribution from the point of view of that particular player. The only vectors
of probabilistic values, or ’group values’ considered by Weber are the semivalues and the
random-order values, whose relations with our probabilistic model will be also established
in this section. But our vectors of probabilistic values are not to be interpreted as vectors
of subjective evaluations based on n independent points of view. On the contrary, they
6We will not discuss here Straﬃn’s (1977, 1982 and 1988) probabilistic model, extended by Dubey,
Neyman and Weber (1981) to all semivalues. In Laruelle and Valenciano (2002) it is shown how this
sophisticated model ﬁts within the one considered here, but is not more general.






S(v(S ∪ i) − v(S)),
with 0 ≤ p
i





S =1 . It is immediate to see that both formulations are equivalent: the
coeﬃcient p
i
S in this formula is just the p
i
S∪i in (5).
10should be interpreted as assessments of every player’s marginal contribution based on a
single (and same for all players) distribution of probability over coalitions.
But of course not all vectors of probabilistic values can be interpreted as particulariza-
tions of (3)-(4). This is not surprising: one cannot expect consistency from n independent
subjective points of view.
4.2 Weighted weak semivalues
In Calvo and Santos (2000) two classes of ’solutions’ emerge axiomatically by adding
to the properties that characterize probabilistic values (linearity, positivity and dummy
axiom (Weber, 1979, 1988)), either ’balanced contributions’ or the weaker ’w-balanced
contributions’ (both conditions are discussed in section 5). They call ’weighted weak
semivalues’ to the class of solutions that emerges by adding the second condition.
A weighted weak semivalue is a map Ψ : GN → RN which assigns to each game (N,v)






wi pS (v(S) − v(S\i)), (6)
where wN =( wi)i∈N is an N-weight vector s.t., wi > 0, for all i ∈ N,a n dpN =




for every i ∈ N. Calvo and Santos (2000) prove that map (6) is characterized by linear-
ity, positivity, dummy axiom and w-balanced contributions, but no clear interpretation
of this family, born axiomatically, nor of the coeﬃcients pS and the ’weights’, is given.
They interpret weighted weak semivalues just as a subclass of (vectors of) probabilistic
values (formula (5)) in which the players’ beliefs (in Weber’s terms) satisfy a weak form of







wj, for all S ⊆ N
and all i,j ∈ S.
The following result provides a clear interpretation of this family, showing that the
family of maps generated by (3)-(4) for diﬀerent probability distributions is the family of
weighted weak semivalues. It provides as well of a meaning for these coeﬃcients and these
weights.
Theorem 1 The family of maps Φ(−,p):GN → RN, generated by formula (4) for
diﬀerent probability distributions p in PN, i st h ef a m i l yo fw e i g h t e dw e a ks e m i v a l u e s .
Proof. Confronting formula (6) with formulae (3)-(4), it is clear that for any probability
distribution p ∈ PN,d e ﬁning pN =( pS)S⊆N,S =∅, and wN =( wi)i∈N by
pS := p(S), and wi :=
1











for any player i and any game (N,v).
Reciprocally, any weighted weak semivalue can be generated in this way. Let ΨpN,wN
be a weighted weak semivalue given by (6), with associated coeﬃcients pS and weights
wi. Mind there is a degree of indeterminacy both in the weights and the coeﬃcients: the
weights can be all multiplied by any positive constant and the coeﬃcients divided by this
same constant so that the constraint
 
S:i∈S
wipS =1i ss a t i s ﬁed and the associated weighted
weak semivalue remains the same. Thus, deﬁning p N =( p 




























1, taking p ∈ PN,g i v e nb yp(∅): =0 , and p(S): =p 




for any game (N,v).
Thus, weighted weak semivalues are the vectors of players’ expected marginal con-
tributions to the coalition which will form for arbitrary probability distributions in PN,
conditional to the player belonging to it. What is specially remarkable in this equivalence
is that in our model both the coeﬃcients pS and the ’weights’ wi acquire a precise mean-
ing (7). Once eliminated the indeterminacy factor as in the second part of the proof, for
each S  = ∅, pS is the probability of S being the coalition formed, while the ’weight’ wi of
player i is not a weight any more, but just the inverse of the probability of such player
entering the coalition that will form. Thus ’weights’ disappear in this model as just an
’optical eﬀect’. On the other hand, under the point of view provided by our general model
the nature of the ’consistency’ alluded by Calvo and Santos becomes clear: the players’
assessments are based on a single and same probability distribution over coalitions. Thus
from this point of view it turns out artiﬁcial and superﬂuous to speak any more of a vector
of assessments resulting from n points of view.
4.3 Weak semivalues
In the same paper Calvo and Santos (2000) introduce a particular class of weighted weak
semivalues that is a generalization of the concept of semivalue (see next subsection). A
weak semivalue is a weighted weak semivalue in which all players have the same weight.





pS(v(S) − v(S\i)), (8)
for some pS such that 0 ≤ pS ≤ 1a n d
 
S:i∈S
pS =1f o re v e r yi ∈ N. Calvo and Santos (2000)
prove that this family is characterized by linearity, positivity, dummy axiom and balanced
contributions. They form obviously a subfamily of the weighted weak semivalues, the one
corresponding to those whose associated weights are the same for all players.
Confronting formulae (3) and (8), it is clear that when the probability of being a
member of the coalition that will form is the same for all players, that is, when for any







what emerges from the general model presented in section 3 are weak semivalues. More-
over, in view of the correspondence established in Theorem 1, we have as a corollary the
following equivalence
Proposition 2 The family of maps Φ(−,p):GN → RN, generated by formula (4) for
diﬀerent probability distributions p in PN such that for any two players the probability of
entering the coalition which will form is the same, is the family of weak semivalues.
Thus, weak semivalues are the vectors of players’ conditional expected marginal con-
tributions to the coalition which will form for probability distributions over coalitions for
which the probability of any player entering the coalition which will form is the same.
4.4 Semivalues
Semivalues were introduced by Weber (1979) (see also Weber (1988), Dubey, Neyman and
Weber (1981), and Einy (1987)). A semivalue is a vector of probabilistic values (formula




s = t. In other words, coeﬃcients in (5) only depend on the size of S.T h u sas e m i v a l u e




ps(v(S) − v(S\i)) (9)
13for some ps such that 0 ≤ ps ≤ 1f o rs =1 ,...,n,and
 
S:i∈S
ps =1 8. They are characterized
by anonymity, null player, and linearity (Weber, 1979, 1988). Again confronting (3) and
(9), and in view of the previous equivalences, we have the following result whose proof we
omit.
Proposition 3 The family of maps Φ(−,p):GN → RN, generated by formula (4) for
probability distributions p in PN for which the probability of a coalition to form depends
only on its size, is the family of semivalues. Moreover, if Ψ is the semivalue given by
formula (9), then
Ψ(v)=Φ(v,p)









, for any S  = ∅. (10)
Thus, semivalues are the vectors of players’ conditional expected marginal contribu-
tions to the coalition which will form when the probability of a coalition forming only
depends on its size9.
4.5 Weighted Shapley values
Weighted Shapley values result by eliminating symmetry in Shapley’s (1953a) character-
izing system. This extension was introduced by Shapley himself in (1953b) associating a
positive weight wi with each player and distributing payoﬀs in unanimity games propor-
tionally to these weights. In this way, keeping the other conditions (linearity, eﬃciency
and null-player), a unique payoﬀ vector for every game is determined10.
8In fact, consistently with the variant chosen by Weber to deﬁne the probabilistic values (footnote 7),




ps(v(S ∪ i) − v(S))
for some ps such that 0 ≤ ps ≤ 1f o rs =0 ,...,n −1a n d
 
S:i/ ∈S
ps =1 . Note the coeﬃcient ps in the second
formula is just the ps+1 in the ﬁrst one.
9In contrast with the usual interpretation, in Laruelle and Valenciano (2001) semivalues, in the context
of simple games and within the axiomatic approach, are interpreted as assessments of the relative capacity
to inﬂuence the outcome of a vote attached to diﬀerent roles in diﬀerent decision rules from as i n g l ep o i n t
of view.
10Kalai and Samet (1987) extended the notion to ’weight systems’ enabling a weight zero for some players,
and characterized the resulting family of ’random order’ values, which in Weber (1988) are characterized as
the unique vectors of probabilistic values that satisfy eﬃciency. As we will see only the weighted Shapley
values within this family ﬁti n( 3 ) - ( 4 ) .
14Hart and Mas-Colell (1987) characterized weighted Shapley values by means of eﬃ-
ciency and the existence of w-potential (see section 5). Then, in view of Calvo and Santos’s
(2000) characterization of weighted weak semivalues (linearity, positivity, dummy player
and w-balanced contributions), and the equivalence of w-potential and w-balanced con-
tributions (Calvo and Santos, 1997), it follows that weighted Shapley values are weighted
weak semivalues, and consequently also ﬁt in this probabilistic model. Moreover, weighted
Shapley values are the eﬃcient weighted weak semivalues. The point is: which probabil-
ity distributions generate these values? The following theorem, similar to Theorem 11 in
Weber (1988) and that we prove for completeness, answers the question.




Φi(v,p)=v(N) for all v), if and only if the probability distribution p ∈ PN,
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Where the last equality follows form (i) and (ii).
(⇒)N o wa s s u m e
 
i∈N
Φi(v,p)=v(N), for any game (N,v). Then let (N,uS) denote for







pi(N), and (i) follows. And for any S # N,l e tˆ uS the game such
that ˆ uS(T)=1i fT $ S and ˆ uS(T) = 0 otherwise. Then we have
Φi(uS,p) − Φi(ˆ uS,p)=
 
pi(S)i f i ∈ S,
−pi(S ∪ i)i f i ∈ N \ S.












pj(S ∪ j)=0 .
Hence (ii) follows too.
15The following result, the proof of which we leave to the reader, shows the connection
between the ’weights’ and the associated probability distribution for weighted Shapley
values.
Theorem 3 Am a pΦ(−,p):GN → RN, generated by formula (4) satisﬁes ’eﬃciency’
and coincides with the w-weighted Shapley value for a vector of positive weights w ∈ Rn
+,











(∀T ⊆ N, ∀i ∈ T).
As one can take wi = 1
Prob{S i},i ti sp o s s i b l et oe l i m i n a t ewi in the equations of the
above system. Thus, Theorem 3 yields an alternative characterization of weighted Shapley
values.
Corollary 1 Am a pΦ(−,p):GN → RN, generated by formula (4) satisﬁes ’eﬃciency’







Prob{S   i}
(∀T ⊆ N).
The system speciﬁed by conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2, as the one connecting
weights and probabilities in the Theorem 3, or the characterizing condition in the corollary,
show how unnatural is requiring or expecting ’eﬃciency’ in the setting provided by this
probabilistic model. Only for very special probability distributions over coalitions the
players’ conditional expected marginal contributions to the coalition that will form add up
to the worth of the grand coalition. In Weber (1988), referring to the random order values,
it is stated that ”a collection of individual probabilistic values is eﬃcient for all games in
its domain precisely when the players’ probabilistic views of the world are consistent; that
is, only when the various.. [individual probabilistic views] arise from a single distribution
[over the n! possible orderings of the players]” (italics and brackets are ours). But it
should be noted that a similar type of consistency is to be found as we have shown in all
the previous notions without eﬃciency. Moreover, all of them arise from one and the same
probabilistic model.
4.6 The Shapley value
As is well-known, the Shapley value is the only element of the intersection of all the
precedent families. In view of formula (10), which gives the probability distributions over
coalitions p that yield every semivalue as a particular case of Φ(−,p), we have the following
result.













, for any S  = ∅.
Thus, the Shapley value of player i gives the expected marginal contribution of this
player to the coalition that will form conditional to this player belonging to it if the
coalition is chosen as follows. With probability p(∅) < 1 the empty coalition is chosen;
with probability 1 − p(∅) proceed as follows: a coalition’s size (from 1 to n)i sc h o s e n
with probability inversely proportional to the size, then one coalition of size s is chosen at
random, all of them being equally probable. Note this probabilistic model is completely
diﬀerent from the usual one reviewed in section 2 in which players enter sequentially
according to an order chosen at random up to the grand coalition is formed, but they do
not receive their marginal contribution to its worth.
5 Some properties reexamined
Since Shapley’s seminal paper some attention has been paid to the search of new ’ax-
iomatic’ characterizations of the Shapley value. We examine and reinterpret now some of
the most popular conditions introduced by diﬀerent authors to provide alternative char-
acterizations, from the point of view provided by this probabilistic model. We review the
properties introduced by Dubey (1975) (see also Feltkamp (1995)), Young (1985), Myerson
(1980), and Hart and Mas-Colell (1987)) to replace additivity.
5.1 Transfer and strong monotonicity
Dubey (1975), in order to characterize the Shapley-Shubik index, that is to say, the Shapley
value in the domain of simple games, replaced the linearity, that does not make sense in
this domain, by what here, following Weber (1988), we will call the ’transfer’ property.
Later Feltkamp (1995) showed that this condition, weaker that linearity, can replace it, and
characterized the Shapley value in GN along with eﬃciency, anonymity and null player.
Transfer (T): For any v,w ∈ D ⊆ GN, s.t. v ∧ w, v ∨ w ∈ D :
Ψ(v)+Ψ(w)=Ψ(v ∧ w)+Ψ(v ∨ w),
where (v ∧ w)(S): =m i n {v(S),w(S)} and (v ∨ w)(S): =m a x {v(S),w(S)}.
It is immediate to check that as is well-known all of the families of variants of Φ(−,p)
considered in the previous section satisfy additivity and consequently also this weak form
17of additivity. Nevertheless our model does not provide any alternative interpretation to
this condition.
Young (1985) characterized the value Shapley as the only value in the domain of
monotonic games which veriﬁes eﬃciency, anonymity and strong monotonicity.
Strong Monotonicity (SMon): Av a l u eΨ : D ⊆ GN → RN satisﬁes strong mono-
tonicity (SMon) if for any two games v and w in D,a n da n yp l a y e ri ∈ N,
MCi(v) ≤ MCi(w) ⇒ Ψi(v) ≤ Ψi(w).
Where MCi(v): =( v(S) − v(S\i))S i.
The meaning of this condition is clear and it is obviously satisﬁed by any evaluation
Φi(−,p) according to formula (4), to which is in fact inherent, whatever the probability
distribution p ∈ PN.
In sum, both conditions, transfer and strong monotonicity, are rather general properties
that are satisﬁed by all evaluations of the form Φ(−,p) for any probability distribution p ∈
PN. As to their meaning in our model’s terms, it is clear only that of strong monotonicity,
which is inherent to this model.
5.2 Balanced contributions
In Myerson (1980) the Shapley value is characterized by means of eﬃciency and ’balanced
contributions’. The formulation of this condition requires the restriction of a coalitional
game to a subset of players. Let (N,v) ∈ GN, for any i ∈ N,w ew i l ld e n o t eb y( N\i,vN\i)
the game in GN\i, deﬁned by vN\i(S): =v |N\i (S)=v(S)f o ra n yS ⊆ N\i.T os i m p l i f y
the notation we will write vN\i instead of (N\i,vN\i) if no confusion arises. For N\i = ∅,
(∅,vN\i) is the trivial 0-game.
Balanced Contributions (BC): For any (N,v) ∈ D ⊆ GN, and all i,j ∈ N,
Ψi(v) − Ψi(vN\j)=Ψj(v) − Ψj(vN\i). (11)
The usual interpretation is that for any two players the beneﬁto fe a c ho ft h e mf r o m
the participation of the other is the same. Calvo and Santos (2000) show that the weak
semivalues are the vectors of probabilistic values that satisfy balanced contributions. They
also show that the weighted weak semivalues is the family of group values that satisfy the
following weaker version of this property, with a similar meaning, but in which every
player’s beneﬁts are weighted according to a ’weight system’ w =( wi)i∈N.
18w-Balanced Contributions (w-BC): For any game (N,v)a n da l li,j ∈ N,
1
wi
(Ψi(v) − Ψi(vN\j)) =
1
wj
(Ψj(v) − Ψj(vN\i)). (12)
It is not possible to discuss the meaning of any of these conditions in the framework of
this probabilistic model unless we specify a way of restricting to N\i players the second
ingredient in it, that is, the probability distribution over coalitions. A natural way of doing
it, consistent with the meaning of this probability, is the following. If only the information
concerning N\i matters, coalitions S and S∪i are indistinguishable form this (i.e., N\i’s)
point of view. Thus given p ∈ PN,w ed e ﬁne the restriction of p to N\i as the distribution
pN\i ∈ PN\i given by11
pN\i(S): =p(S)+p(S ∪ i) for all S ⊆ N\i. (13)
Remark 1: It is easy to check from (13) that for all j ∈ N \ i,






pN\i(T)=ProbpN\i {S   j}. (14)
That is to say, for any player in N \ i the probability of belonging to the coalition that
will form in N and in N \ i according to p and pN\i, respectively, is the same.
Adopting (13) as the way of restricting probability distributions to N\i players, we
can reformulate the balanced contributions condition (11) in terms of our probabilistic
model as follows. For all i,j ∈ N,
Φi(v,p) − Φi(vN\j,p N\j)=Φj(v,p) − Φj(vN\i,p N\i). (15)
Now one can wonder if for any p the evaluation Φi(−,p) given by (4) satisﬁes this
condition or not for any two players and any game. The following lema gives the answer
and yields as corollaries all mentioned characterizing results, giving them a clear meaning
within this probabilistic model.
Lemma 1 For all (N,v) ∈ GN,a l lp ∈ PN,a n da l li,j ∈ N, it holds
Ep[v(S) − v(S\i)] − EpN\j[vN\j(S) − vN\j(S\i)] (16)
= Ep[v(S) − v(S\j)] − EpN\i[vN\i(S) − vN\i(S\j)].
11Observe this condition yields as a particular case the well-known condition of consistency for semivalues







19Proof. Taking into account (13), we have











p(S)(v(S) − v(S\i)) −
 
S⊆N\j




p(S)( v(S) − v(S\i) − v(S\j)+v(S\{i,j}).
Then (16) follows from the symmetry of the last expression with respect to i and j.
Note expression (16) makes a clear sense: the mutual contributions of any two players
to each other’s expected marginal contribution are the same. As we will see it deserves
the title of generalized balanced contributions. In view of Lemma 1, Remark 1 and (3)








p(T)) (Φj(v,p) − Φj(vN\i,p N\i)).







two players. So it follows immediately the following
Corollary 2 Φ(−,p):GN → RN veriﬁes ’probabilistic’ balanced contributions, that is,
(15), if and only for any two players the probability of belonging to the coalition that will
form is the same.
Which is consistent with the above alluded result of Calvo and Santos (2000) in which
balanced contributions characterize (along with the conditions characterizing probabilistic
values) the weak semivalues, that as we have seen in subsection 4.3 are precisely what the
conditional marginal contributions vector becomes when any two players have the same
the probability of belonging to the coalition that will form.
Note that calling again wi := 1  
T:i∈T
p(T), as in (7) in subsection 4.2, (17) becomes the
probabilistic counterpart in our framework of the w-balanced contributions condition (12),
which as established in Calvo and Santos (2000) characterizes (along with the conditions
characterizing probabilistic values) the weighted weak semivalues. Thus we have also the
following
Corollary 3 For any p ∈ PN, the evaluation given by the map Φ(−,p):GN → RN
satisﬁes condition (17) or its equivalent (16).
20Thus, again, in exact correspondence with what happened with the ’weighted’ weak
semivalues, ’weights’ disappear as an ’optical eﬀect’ or a misunderstanding. It can be
then concluded that in our setting condition (16), the counterpart of ’weighted’ balanced
contributions in the usual setting , is the really general condition satisﬁed by all evaluations
Φ(−,p), while the counterpart of balanced contributions holds only in especial cases.
5.3 The potential
In Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) the Shapley value is characterized as the unique eﬃcient
solution that admits a ’potential’. A solution Ψ : GN → RN admits a potential if there
exists a map P : GN → R, called then the ’potential’ of Ψ, such that
Ψi(v)=P(v) − P(vN\i)( f o r a l l i ∈ N). (18)










where p is a ’standard’ though rather ad hoc probability distribution over coalitions.
Calvo and Santos (2000) prove that semivalues and weak semivalues also admit a
potential. But this property needs to be relaxed to cover other solutions, as is the case of
the weighted Shapley values, that for a vector of weights w admit a ’w-potential’ (Hart and
Mas-Colell, 1989). In fact Hart and Mas-Colell’s w-potential is a combination of eﬃciency
and something else. The amalgamation of these two conditions allows them to characterize
the weighted Shapley values with it. Calvo and Santos (1997) disentangle these two
conditions and formulate the condition in the following terms. A solution Ψ : GN → RN
admits a w-potential if there exists a map P : GN → R, and a vector of positive weights
w, such that
Ψi(v)=wi (P(v) − P(vN\i)) (for all i ∈ N). (20)
The same authors in Calvo and Santos (2000) prove that weighted weak semivalues
are the only vectors of probabilistic values that admit a w-potential.
For a precise interpretation of the former notions and the mentioned results we will
introduce a general concept of ’potential’ with an obvious meaning in our model (so much
that it will make superﬂuous and inadequate that term). For any (N,v) ∈ GN and any
p ∈ PN, let
P(v,p): =Ep[v(S)], (21)
12They require P(∅,v)=0 .
21that is to say, P(v,p)i sthe expected worth of the coalition that will form, given the game
(N,v) and the probability distribution over coalitions p. Then, the consistency relation
(13) to restrict p ∈ PN to N\i, yields the following relation:
Lemma 2 For any (N,v) ∈ GN,a n da l lp ∈ PN,
Ep[v(S) − v(S\i)] = Ep[v(S)] − EpN\i[vN\i(S)].
Proof. According to (13), from (3) we have

















p(S)( v(S) − v(S\i)) = Ep[v(S) − v(S\i)].
That is to say, the expected marginal contribution of every player to the worth of the
coalition which will form, coincides with the marginal contribution of his/her participation
to the expected worth. Then, combining (3) and the lemma, results
Φi(v,p)=Ep[v(S) − v(S\i) | i ∈ S]=
Ep[v(S) − v(S\i)]
Prob{S   i}
=
Ep[v(S)] − EpN\i[vN\i(S)]
Prob{S   i}
. (22)
Formula (22) includes as particular cases all results involving the diﬀerent variations
of the potential notion. First notice that for any p ∈ PN such that for any player the
probability of belonging to the coalition that will form is the same (as for weak semivalues),
the denominators in (22) for diﬀerent i’s become ’hidden’ in the sense that they do not
depend on i. Thus, calling








= Ep[v(S) | i ∈ S],
a mysterious function (the ’potential’ in fact) emerges, so that (22) can be rewritten in







= P(v) − P(vN\i).
That is, yielding Hart and Mas-Colell’s condition (18), which is guaranteed only for
weak semivalues, as established by Calvo and Santos (2000). But mind that in general
22Prob{S   i} depends on i and consequently the above formula not even makes any sense.
While (22) makes sense and holds for any p. And notice that again denoting by wi the
inverse of Prob{S   i}, that is, wi := 1  
T:i∈T
p(T), condition (22) becomes
Φi(v,p)=wi(Ep[v(S)] − EpN\i[v(S)]) = wi(P(v,p) − P(vN\i,p N\i)). (23)
In other words, the general condition satisﬁed by all evaluations of the form Φ(−,p)i s
(22), or its equivalent (23), whose counterpart in the usual setting is ’weighted’ potential.
And again, as before, the ’weighted’ character of the notion evaporates13. Similarly, for-
mula (21) seems that of a general, natural14 and transparent notion of potential, even if
that name is out of place in this context, given its obvious meaning: the expected worth
of the coalition which will form.
6 Concluding remarks
We have provided an extremely simple model with great unifying power, in which a va-
riety of notions acquire a transparent meaning. On the one hand, several families of
’solutions’ born out of diﬀerent departures from Shapley’s seminal characterization ap-
pear as particular cases of a general and simple story: the evaluation of the expected
marginal contribution of every player to the coalition that will form conditional to that
player belonging to it. And the disgusting ’weights’ associated with some of these notions
evaporate as pure misunderstandings. On the other hand, some interesting notions from
the theory of value, as the existence of potential and the balanced contributions condition,
lose their ’mystery’ and appear as obvious properties of some particular cases within a
general model. While the ’weighted’ variants of both notions turn out to be the true
general and transparent properties with a clear meaning.
A ’disappointingly’ simple story? The tight ﬁtting of a variety of notions born out
of axiomatic exploration into so simple a model cannot be dismissed without reﬂection.
You may choose: the fascinating obscurities of the axiomatic approach to value or the
13This is not that surprising after having seen what happens with balanced contributions, given the
equivalence of w-balanced contributions and the existence of a w-potential in the usual setting (Calvo and
Santos, 1997)). But we have preferred discussing separately both notions and their meaning in our setting,
for we are mainly concerned in this paper with the ’meaning’ of notions and results.








Where for every t ∈ [0,1],N(t)=
 




i being, for each i ∈ N, a random variable (all them
independent) with distribution function Prob(X
i ≤ t)=t
wi for all t ∈ [0,1].
23transparency of the probabilistic tale to account for them. To keep thinking in terms of
’solutions’ axiomatically characterized and ignore that everything is ai fit were the simple
story we have presented in this paper, or to adopt this as the story we have been turning
around but have failed so far grasping. Is it not simpler to think that the earth moves
rather than only that everything is as if it moved?
On the other hand, the simple story of our probabilistic model seems to have very
little to do with Shapley’s original interpretation of his ’value’ for TU games, as the value
for a rational player of the prospect of engaging into any situation of this class with
other rational players. But the lack of a clear matching of the diﬀerent combinations of
axioms with the genuine notion of value, along with the perfect matching with the extreme
simple probabilistic model presented here, sheds serious doubts about the achievements
of the axiomatic approach since Nash (1950) and Shapley (1953) in connection with the
notion of value. Maybe it has ended by even shedding more shadows than light on the
issue. If additivity has raised suspicion from the very beginning, its substitutes (balanced
contributions, strong monotonicity, transfer, or the existence of potential) or their weighted
variants, shared by all the axiomatic systems that generate the diﬀerent families considered
here, are in no more clear way connected with the original notion of value. Transfer is a
bit weaker than additivity, but cannot be compellingly motivated. Balanced contributions
can be justiﬁed on fairness grounds (which makes sense only for an allocation rule). As
to its equivalent, the existence of potential, it may only raise some in our opinion not
especially illuminating fascination. There is only left Young’s strong monotonicity, with a
transparent meaning, again compelling for an allocation rule, but completely dependent (as
null player) on the notion of ’marginal contribution’, so cherished by economists but with
no clear translation into the more general NTU terms. In sum, a convincing axiomatization
of the Shapley value in the genuine sense is still missing in our opinion in spite of many
people thinking it is an exhausted issue. But this should be obvious: only a compelling
characterization which made sense and worked on a domain wider than that of TU games
could claim to be thoroughly acceptable, and this is still missing.
The results presented in this paper yield thus a critical conclusion about the excesses
of the axiomatic approach and the unjustiﬁed disregard of the probabilistic interpretation.
It seems that comparatively speaking the probabilistic approach is considered less worthy
than the axiomatic one. As a result much less attention has been paid to this approach.
Is this regard justiﬁed? The least this paper permits to conclude is the complementariness
of the probabilistic and the axiomatic approaches. Even if one were exclusively interested
in the axiomatic point of view, this paper shows how a probabilistic model contributes to
a better understanding of the meaning of axioms.
24Finally, however illuminating the model might be, it is too simple a model. A single
coalition forms, why not more? Another line of further development may be a richer model
in which the probability distribution were endogenously generated. Further developments
from the starting point provided by the model seem promising. Maybe the transparent
story presented in this paper can be a more inspiring starting point than a set of more or
less beautiful and more or less obscure abstract axioms.
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